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MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
PRODUCT DESIGN: A PROPOSED
STATUTORY REFORM
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.t

Amid all the current discussion of an imminent products liability crisis
and the growing concern over the diminishing availability of products
liability insurance, I an important point is apt to be overlooked: there is more
at stake than can be measured in dollars and cents. Indeed, the integrity of
the judicial process may hang in the balance. The tendency toward more
frequent and higher products liability claims has been accompanied (supported, some might insist) by a tendency toward vaguer rules of decision,
especially in cases involving allegedly defective product design. That this
tendency toward vagueness has presented courts with substantial difficulties
has been chronicled elsewhere. 2 This article proposes a product design
liability statute aimed at reducing the difficulties in these cases to manageable levels and rendering adjudicable the liability issue. In making such a
proposal one runs the risk of displeasing almost everyone. Those favoring
higher, more frequent plaintiffs' recoveries may resent what are viewed as
unwarranted cutbacks in manufacturers' liability. Those who are alarmed at
the mounting costs of liability insurance may conclude that the proposal
does not go far enough. However, if it is borne in mind that this article is as
much concerned with the problem of restoring principled decisionmaking as
with the question of who recovers what, then the choices reflected in the
statute may more readily be understood.
I.

THE IISCHIEF REQUIRING REMEDY: CHAOS AT COMMON LAW

3
Behind every statute there presumably is a mischief requiring remedy.

t Professor, Boston University School of Law; A.B. 1959, Princeton University; LL.B.
1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard.
1. See, e.g., 5 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 227,228 (1977) (remarks of participants
in the first West Coast Product Liability Prevention Seminar, held March 16-18, 1977). See also
id. at 267 (summary of testimony at "Hearings Before the House Small Business Subcommittee
on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities," March 4 and 6, 1977).
2. See generally Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Hoenig & Goetz, A
Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6
Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1974); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An
Interactionof Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425 (1974).
3. See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
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In this instance, the mischief may be described succinctly: the defect
concept, upon which section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 is
premised, is an inadequate tool with which to determine liability in cases
involving harm alleged to have been tortiously caused by manufacturers'
conscious design choices.5 This inadequacy does not stem from the fact that
the defect concept excludes important factors from consideration in design
cases. Rather, the defect concept includes too many loosely interrelated
factors, important and trivial, and -renders impossible the essentially linear
chains of logic upon which arguments in adjudication are of necessity
based. 6 In cases involving manufacturing flaws, the product design provides
a specific, built-in standard against which to measure the legal adequacy of
the particular product that injured the plaintiff. 7 However, when the plaintiff
attacks the product design itself, in the absence of any express promises or
relevant statutory requirements regarding performance or design, no such
specific, built-in standard is available. Instead, courts must rely upon the
vague tort standard of "reasonableness under all the circumstances" 8 in
determining whether or not product designs are defective.
The judicial tendency in recent years has been increasingly to rely upon
conclusory expert testimony in sending design cases to the jury. 9 To be sure,
the resulting general verdicts may serve to obscure the analytical difficulties
inevitably encountered in reaching decisions. However, in relying upon
them in this context the courts have impliedly countenanced decision-bywhim. 10 Manufacturers have been exposed to greater liability by virtue of
these developments; but the exposure has been essentially random. Thus,
the present system of handling design cases in most jurisdictions is analogous to a roulette game, in which the injured plaintiffs are steadily being
allowed to cover more and more numbers on the wheel with larger and
larger wagers. Were the courts to cover all the numbers on behalf of the
plaintiffs-in other words, were they to embrace absolute manufacturers'
liability for design-caused harm-the process would cease being a game of
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
5. See, e.g., Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Lai,, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 488-91 (1976); Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is
There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109 (1976).

6. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 1534-39.
7. See id. at 1544-46.
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & Comment i (1965). To be sure, some
courts have purported to eliminate the requirement of "unreasonably dangerous" from the rule
established in § 402A. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153,
1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). However, in design cases the standard is reasonableness,
despite judicial protestations to the contrary. See text accompanying notes 33-36 infra.
9. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 490. See also Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 2.
10. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 490-91.

1978]

DEFECTIVE PRODUCT DESIGN

627

chance. Yet courts have refused, and undoubtedly will continue to refuse, to
go this far. I I Therefore, the common law approach in design cases is, and
without statutory intervention will almost surely remain, essentially a lottery. The statute that follows is proposed as a means of reducing the role
played by chance in design cases and of returning consistency and rationality to this area of the law.

II.

A PROPOSED STATUTORY REFORM

A.

General Reflections Upon Statutory Reform in Products Liability
Proposals for statutory reform in the products liability area fall into
three basic categories: (1) no-fault proposals; 12 (2) proposals for guaranteeing the continued availability to manufacturers of liability insurance; 13 and
(3) proposals for substantive reform of the rules governing liability. 14 Given
the drastic and, at present, politically unacceptable sweep of the first type of
proposal, 15 and the relative superficiality of the second, 16 this article
concentrates upon the third-upon the possibility of reforming the rules of
liability to render them more specific and meaningful guides to decision.
The next section proposes statutory language aimed at accomplishing this
objective. The purpose of this section is to explore generally some of the
difficulties likely to be encountered in attempting to draft a proposal of this
sort. More specific comments upon choices among alternatives will be left
for a later section.
A basic question with which to begin is: Should the statutory reform
come at the state or federal level? Obviously, there is a sufficient federal
interest involved to support substantial federal intrusion; '" but equally obviously, one should hesitate to federalize, in a single, bold stroke, a body of
11. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 1554.
12. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975).
13. At this writing, several proposals of this sort have been introduced into Congress: S.
527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), sponsored by Senators John C. Culver (Iowa) and Gaylord
Nelson (Wisconsin), which calls for the creation of a temporary federal reinsurance pool for
small businesses; and S. 403, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), sponsored by Senator James B.
Pearson (Kansas), which provides for reinsurance to products liability insurers and to qualifying captive insurance companies.
14. For a summary of recent reform proposals, see Henderson, Products Liability: The
Gathering Momentum Toward Statutory Reform, 1 CORP. L. REV. 41, 42-16 (1977).
15. Certainly a comprehensive compulsory no-fault scheme could be expected to encounter considerable opposition. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 70-88. Although
Professor O'Connell offers an elective no-fault proposal, it is doubtful that even his scheme
would be acceptable. See Henderson, Book Review, 56 B.U.L. REv. 830 (1976).
16. From the viewpoint of a manufacturer hard-pressed to meet its requirements for
products liability insurance, this may seem a gratuitously casual statement. However, proposals
of this sort are superficial because they merely treat the symptoms of the difficulty, and not the
cause. See VII THE RESEARCH GROUP, INC., PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL
STUDY 199-201 (Interagency Task Force on Product Liability Jan. 1977).

17. Clearly the activities subject to regulation by federal law under this proposal affect
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law that has traditionally been part of the states' common law of torts. The
uniformity that might be achieved by federal legislation would be desirable,
to the extent that one views the problems caused by vagueness in rules to be
exacerbated by the diversity in approaches among the states. However, to
attempt to transform products liability into a comprehensive body of federal
law would present a very difficult drafting task and would, assuming general
federal question jurisdiction in the district courts, thrust an enormous potential burden upon a federal judiciary already hard-pressed to meet current
demands for their attention. 18
The statutory proposal that follows adopts a federal approach, but one
carefully limited in its thrust to minimize difficulties of the sort just
described. Thus, the proposal leaves untouched and substantially unaffected
the vast bulk of state common law principles of products liability, intruding
only to the extent necessary to render the rules of decision in design cases
sufficiently specific to support principled decisionmaking. No new federal
causes of action are created; no new bases for federal court jurisdiction are
contemplated or required. Even if products liability reform were to be
accomplished by legislation at the state level, this "minimum intrusion"
approach would be the most sensible way to cure the deficiencies of the
current common law products liability system. Whether at the federal or
state level, reform is required only to the extent necessary to cure the
existing mischief. Once the minimum necessary specificity is built back into
the rules of decision, products liability may and should be left to develop by
the traditional common law process.
This article is concerned with the area of products liability based upon
manufacturers' product design choices. Should other areas of products
liability be addressed statutorily? The answer here is almost certainly
"yes," to the extent that areas other than liability for product design
involve similar problems. One such area is that of manufacturers' liability
for failure to warn. The obvious connections between defective design and
failure to warn as conceptual bases of products liability have been written of
elsewhere. 19 Admittedly, failure to warn does not present analytical difficulty of the same magnitude as does defective design. 20 However, since some
commerce among the states sufficiently to support congressional action under U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8.
18. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, IMPACT STUDY: THE
EFFECT OF' MAJOR STATUTES AND EVENTS ON CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASELOAD IN THE U.S.

DISTRICT COURTS DURING FISCAL YEARS 1960-1975 (1976), cited in Clark, A Commentary on

Congestion in the Federal Courts, 8 SAINT MARY'S L.J. 407, 407 (1976); notes 30 & 31 and
accompanying text infra.
19. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 1562-65.
20. See Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 545-47

(1976).
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courts appear to be tending in the direction of unprincipled decisions in
connection with that theory of liability, 21 some statutory bolstering is probably called for. 22 It must be emphasized that the boundaries of legitimate
statutory intrusion are relatively narrow. No massive code is required. Areas
of products liability that appear to be functioning in a more or less principled
fashion-for example, the large and important area of liability for manufacturing flaws, upon which the subject of products liability is historically
based 23-do not warrant being tampered with statutorily.24
Should the products liability statute attempt to apply the same basic
requirements to all actions based upon allegedly defective design, or should
distinctions be drawn based upon factors such as the types of products
involved or the categories of plaintiffs and defendants? This question reflects one of the basic difficulties with which a draftsman must be concerned
when attempting to alter the body of common law principles governing
manufacturers' liability for their conscious design choices. The same vagueness in the common law principles that supports the need for reform at least
permits application of the principles across an enormous range of cases. Can
a statute aimed at injecting specificity into the rules of decision be expected
to impose the same requirements across a broad range of cases involving
many types of products and many categories of users? This question is far
from academic. If distinctions must be introduced, their number and
complexity could threaten the efficacy of the statutory enterprise. To keep
the statute simple and manageable, the draftsman would prefer to speak in
terms such as "all users" and "all products"; but enormous pressures are
placed upon the draftsman by the broad range of circumstances embraced by
25
such language.
21. The type of case envisioned is Moran v. Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11

(1975), in which perfume was impulsively thrown on a lighted candle, under circumstances that
made it fairly clear that the conduct would not have been affected by warnings of the perfume's
flammability. Some courts have suggested that plaintiffs in warnings cases might rely upon a
rebuttable presumption that a warning, if given, would have been read and acted upon. See,
e.g., Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 660 (Tex. 1972).
22. The statute proposed in this article is a version of a larger statutory package that
contains a failure to warn section. See note 26 infra. Other proposals for substantive reform
also contain provisions on the same topic. See Henderson, supra note 14, at 42-46.
23. Most of the classic products liability cases have involved flaws. See, e.g., Hdnningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 1544-46.
24. Of course, general statutory provisions cutting across the entire 'products liability
field, such as statutes of limitations provisions and provisions establishing defenses based upon
product alteration and misuse, would presumably apply to flaw cases as well as to design cases.
See note 26 infra.
25. This can best be understood by means of an example. Before turning momentarily to
examine a suggested solution in the context of product design, consider here an example in
connection with a statute aimed at failure to warn. If one imagines a housewife buying a

630
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The proposal that follows imposes relatively specific requirements
upon plaintiffs in actions based upon allegedly defective product designs.
These requirements constitute necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for
recovery. The statute does not purport to create causes of action; it merely
imposes, via federal law, minimum requirements without which the plaintiff
will not recover. In addition, certain limited defenses are made available
upon proof by a defendant of specifically described circumstances. On its
face, th& statute purports to apply to all products liability claims based upon
allegations of defective or otherwise inadequate product design.
B.

26
The Statute

LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT FORMULA OR DESIGN

(a) In any products liability action, a defendant shall not be liable for
damage claimed to have resulted from the formulation or design of a product
except on the basis of negligence, express warranty, implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose, or misrepresentation. A defendant shall not be
liable for negligence. in the formulation or design of a product unless the
plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to other
facts required to be proved under state or federal law, including other
provisions of this Act, that an alternative formula or design was available at
the time of manufacture.
(b) A formula or design shall not be an alternative for purposes of
section (a) unless it:
(1) provides overall safety as good as or better than the overall
safety of the formula or design in question; and
(2) provides better safety as to the particular hazard the result of
which caused the injury or damage alleged.
(c) An alternative shall not be an available alternative for purposes of
section (a) unless it:
(1) either
(A) was actually in substantial use by other manufacturers
of similar products at the time of manufacture, or
microwave oven for use in the home, one might find acceptable the statutory requirement that
warnings must, to be sufficient, inform users of average intelligence of the risks associated with
using the product. How sensible would such a requirement be when applied to the case of a
housewife harmed by a prescription drug? Or a worker on an assembly line harmed by a punch
press?
26. This statutory proposal is similar to a provision contained in a more comprehensive
statutory package sponsored by the National Products Liability Council (NPLC), a national
manufacturers' group based in Chicago. The NPLC package was drafted by a group that
included, besides the author: Thomas M. Russell and Mary M. Hutchings, Chicago attorneys;
Professor Dan B. Dobbs, of The University of North Carolina School of Law; and Professor
Jerry J. Phillips of the University of Tennessee School of Law. The NPLC package is
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(B) was actually known by the manufacturer of the product
at the time of manufacture, or should have been known by the
manufacturer with reasonable concern for safety; and
(2) could have been adopted by the manufacturer for use at the
time the product in question was manufactured, without causing increases in the costs of production, distribution or use of the productbr

decreases in the utility of the product, unless such increases and
decreases when taken together are significantly outweighed by the
added safety benefits of such alternative formula or design.

(d) A product formula or design which fails to comply with requirements imposed by federal statutes and regulations applicable to the products

at the time of manufacture shall not be an available alternative for purposes
of section (a).
(e) In any products liability action that includes a claim based upon

alleged negligence in the formulation or design of a product, a defendant
shall not be liable on such claim for that portion, including the whole, of the
injury or damage complained of which could have been avoided by attachment to, inclusion in or use with the product of an additional safety or
protective device or substance, if the defendant proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that at the time of purchase:
(1) the product was suited to 'more than a iingle function or
manner of use, and
(2) attachment, inclusion or use of such additional safety or
protective device or substance would have been inappropriate to or
scheduled to be introduced in the near future into Congress and, in a modified version, into the
legislatures of several states. In addition to the section addressing the problem of liability for
product designs, the package includes the following provisions: (1) an outside statute of
limitations period of 10 years from the date of the first sale, lease or delivery of possession of
the product, subject to an exception for subsequent duties imposed upon defendants under
state law to take action with regard to the product; (2) a requirement, in failure to warn cases,
that the hazards in question have been identifiable by the defendant at the time of sale, and that
the plaintiff prove a definite causal connection between the alleged failure to warn and the
injuries suffered; (3) a provision barring recovery when postsale modifications, other than
those made in accordance with the instructions or with the express consent of the defendant,
cause the injuries of which the plaintiff complains; and (4) a provision barring recovery for
injuries daused by product misuse, accompanied by a definition of "misuse" that includes uses
contrary to adequate instructions and uses other than those for which persons of ordinary skill
and judgment would normally and reasonably expect the product to be suitable.
In proposing the statute contained in the text that follows this note, the author does so on
his own account, and in no way whatsoever purports to speak or act for any of the other
persons who have worked on, or who are sponsoring, the NPLC legislative package. In several
important respects the proposal advanced in this article differs from the corresponding section
in the NPLC draft, and the author assumes full and sole responsibility for the version offered
here. He wishes to thank the colleagues from the NPLC project for their good ideas that are
reflected in this proposal; but any blame for errors in judgment that may have found their weary
way into the present draft should be directed at the author alone.
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incompatible with a function or manner of use to which the product was
suited and to which it might, given the circumstances surrounding its
sale or delivery by defendant, foreseeably be put, and
(3) such additional safety or protective device or substance was
offered by the defendant for purchase or use by the person injured or
damaged or by such person's employer, and
(4) the person injured or damaged or such person's employer
did not purchase or use such additional safety or protective device or
substance, and
(5) use of such additional safety or protective device or substance would have avoided or reduced the injury or damage of which
the plaintiff complains.
(f) In any products liability action, a defendant shall not be liable for
negligence in the formulation or design of a product if the defendant proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that the product formula or design
complied with mandatory standards or regulations adopted by the federal
government which were applicable to the product at the time of manufacture
and which pertained directly to the formula or design-related hazard of
which the plaintiff complains, unless the plaintiff proves by clear and
convincing evidence, in addition to other facts required to be proved under
state or federal law, including other provisions of this Act, that the mandatory federal standards or regulations applicable to the product were inadequate to protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from
unreasonable risks of injury or damage.
(g) In any products liability action, a defendant shall not be liable for
the formulation or design of a product unless the plaintiff proves by a
preponderance of the evidence, in addition to other facts required to be
proved under state or federal law, including other provisions of this Act,
that:
(1) the product was the immediate, physical and producing
cause of the injury or damage of which the plaintiff complains; and
(2) in actions to which sections (a), (b), (c), and (d)apply, the
alternative formula or design upon which the plaintiff relies would have
avoided or reduced the injury or damage of which the plaintiff complains.
C. Comments Upon the Proposal
1. General Comments
This statute would probably reduce manufacturers' exposure to liability
for allegedly defective and unreasonable product designs. The word "prob-
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ably" is used advisedly; it is not clear that the statute would affect outcomes
in a large percentage of design cases, nor is it clear that the overall effect
upon claims exposure would be great. As is explained in subsequent
comments, much of the statute's content is derived from the underlying
logic of traditional products liability principles. To be sure, in bringing this
logic and these principles into formal rules of decision instead of leaving
them to be weighed loosely as part of the range of considerations under
vague "defect" or "unreasonableness" rubrics, courts can be expected to
direct verdicts for defendants in a larger percentage of cases. Indeed, that is
the express purpose in proposing the statute: to enable courts to separate the
unworthy design-based.claims from the worthy in a more-principled fashion.
However, the claims thus separated out would for the most part be those that
under our present system take unfair advantage of the vagueness of the rules
and the accompanying inability of judges to cope with the practical pressures favoring a "jury's whim" approach. To reject a proposal of this sort
simply because it would prevent some plaintiffs from reaching juries would
be inappropriate. By its very nature, formality implies sacrifice. A certain
degree of formality in legal rules is necessary, however, for the system to
maintain its integrity. On balance, the trade-offs in this proposal seem
rational. A number of suggestions regarding different trade-offs might be
made; but the suggestion that formal trade-offs are somehow in and of
themselves improper should be rejected in principle.
Although the statute purports to apply broadly to "any products liability action," its substantive provisions are for the most part limited to claims
based upon alleged negligence in product formulation and design. Thus, the
plaintiff would have available, in appropriate cases, other doctrinal bases of
recovery for inadequate design choices, including express warranty, implied
warranty of fitness and misrepresentation.27 Moreover, other factual bases
28
of liability, such as failure to warn, would not be affected by the statute.
"Formulation" as well as "design" is included so that the statute may
apply broadly to all types of products, including cosmetics and prescription
drugs. However, because these latter categories of cases are more often
decided on the basis of product marketing rather than design, 29 the practical
impact of a design-oriented statute in these product areas should be minimal.
27. These doctrinal bases of liability are not affected by the proposal because they do not

threaten the courts with nonadjudicable issues. Whenever one of these doctrines is applicable,
the factual basis for the defendant's liability supplies a standard against which to measure the
product. For example, whenever a seller expressly promises that a product will perform in a

specifically described manner, the product will be judged against the promise rather than
against the vague reasonableness standard.
28. This is not to imply that failure to warn does not deserve to be addressed statutorily.
See notes 21 & 26 supra.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965) appears to have set the
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Can this proposal be implemented via federal legislation? The answer
seems to depend upon the extent to which it could be expected to be selfexecuting in the state courts. Obviously, some burden of interpretation and
review would be placed upon the United States Supreme Court were this
proposal adopted. The provisions of this statute, however, should mesh
sufficiently smoothly with existing state law to minimize that burden) 0 In
considering the efficacy of implementing this proposal via federal statute, it
should be borne in mind that no new federal causes of action are created.
The statute should provide no basis for federal question jurisdiction 3l in the
federal courts.
2.

Elimination of Strict Liability

The first sentence in section (a), wherein strict liability is eliminated as
a basis of liability, may strike some readers as the most singularly remarkable change worked by the statutory proposal. Actually, with respect to the
liability of manufacturers, this provision would work little, if any, real
change in state law. Of course, with respect to defendants other than
manufacturers-retailers, wholesalers, and other nonmanufacturing distributors-the statute would have substantial impact inasmuch as these
defendants are being held strictly liable under existing law. 3 2 Because the
conceptual basis upon which manufacturers are presently being held liable
for their conscious design choices (other than express warranty, implied
warranty of fitness and misrepresentation, which are retained in the proposal 33) is essentially indistinguishable from negligence, 34 section (a) would not
impose a significant change regarding manufacturers' liability. Whenever a
manufacturer's design choices are condemned as defective or unreasonable,
in most cases the implication of negligence is unavoidable. Admittedly,
some courts in recent years have insisted, perhaps foolishly, that manufactone for the judicial treatment of these cases. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d"
978 (8th Cir. 1969); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51,507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45
(1973).

30. Returning design cases to a negligence footing should improve the chances of their
being received with a minimum of disruption. See text accompanying notes 48-49 infra.
31.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Of course, Congress undoubtedly could withhold federal

question jurisdiction in connection with a statute creating a new federal cause of action. Such a
maneuver, however, would place upon the Supreme Court an enormous burden of review.
32. Manufacturers in design cases are basically being held for their negligent design
choices. See text accompanying note 34 infra. Once the label "defective and unreasonably
dangerous" is attached to a product, however, the subsequent sellers in the chain of distribution, though innocent of negligence, are held strictly liable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 402A (1965).
33. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.

34. The authorities supporting this conclusion are surveyed in Kiely, The Art of the
Neglected Obvious in Products Liability Cases: Some Thoughts on Llewellyn's The Common
Law Tradition, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 914, 929-32 (1975).
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turers are being held strictly liable for their design choices independently of
whether those choices were unreasonable. 35 The proof required of plaintiffs
in those cases, however, is basically the same as would be required in a
36
negligence case.
If the shift away from strict manufacturers' liability is not significant,
why does the proposal insist upon negligence as the central basis of liability
for design choices? Part of the answer concerns the impact, previously
alluded to, upon defendants other than manufacturers. The proposal reflects
the judgment that nonmanufacturing distributors should not be held strictly
liable for the negligence of manufacturers. In flaw cases, all defendants are
held strictly liable. 37 In design cases, however, notwithstanding the misapplication to manufacturers of "strict liability" rhetoric, the only defendants
presently being held strictly liable are nonmanufacturing distributors. 38 By
providing for the same legal bases of liability against all defendants, the
statute accomplishes a certain evenhanded equity. 39 The justification for
eliminating strict liability in design cases also rests on the anticipated impact
upon claims against manufacturers. For one thing, eliminating further talk
of "strict liability" in cases in which the concept is so clearly inapplicable
should help to eliminate some of the confusion in judges' and lawyers'
minds regarding a range of issues that recur in design cases. Imposing this
conceptual discipline uniformly upon the states should accelerate the pace at
which clarity of analysis is achieved and should reduce the difficulties of
integrating the provisions of the federal statute with state law. Moreover,
establishing once and for all that the basis of liability for design errors is
negligence should assist in smoothing the transition to comparative fault for
to apply a
those jurisdictions that otherwise might stumble in attempting
4
comparative negligence concept in "strict liability" cases. 0
35. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 123, 501 P.2d 1153, 1155, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 435 (1972); authorities cited in Kiely, supra note 34, at 931 n.68.

36. See, e.g., Kiely, supra note 34, at 929-32; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973). In fairness to Professor Wade, it should be pointed

out that, in his view, the negligence concept should be modified in design cases to include, in
effect, a conclusive presumption of defendants' knowledge of risks. Id. at 834-35. In most
design cases, however, this will make very little difference.

37. Because a built-in standard is available in flaw cases, courts have little difficulty in
holding manufacturers, as well as others, strictly liable. See text accompanying note 7 supra.

38. See note 32 and text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
39. Lest anyone assume that nonmanufacturers are being let off the liability hook
completely, it should be noted that middlemen's negligence will be easier to prove in design

cases than in flaw cases. Moreover, nonmanufacturers remain exposed to liability in appropriate cases on the other bases of liability permitted by the statute-express warranty, implied
warranty of fitness and misrepresentation.
40.

Cf. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 195-96 (1974) (comparative negligence

statutes that are limited to negligence claims should not prevent courts from adopting comparative negligence in strict liability cases).
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The "Available Alternative" Concept

In most jurisdictions, a plaintiff relying upon a claim of inadequate
product design must prove that a feasible alternative design was available to
the manufacturer which, if adopted for use, would have prevented all or part
of the plaintiff's harm.4" What constitutes a feasible alternative is conceptually unclear, however, and courts in their confusion have allowed spurious
claims to reach the jury. 42 Sections (b) and (c) attempt to introduce sufficient
clarity and specificity into the rules to permit more principled patterns of
decision. With respect to the issues addressed in section (b), for example,
the focus in most cases has been upon the requirement, codified in subsection (2), that relates to the particular design hazard that materialized in
harm.4 3 The inclusion of the additional requirement in subsection (1) is not
only consistent with basic products liability principles, but also may serve to
draw attention to, and bolster judicial confidence in dealing firmly with, the
elements of proof required of the plaintiff.
The emphasis in subsection (c)(1) upon actual use and knowledge is
aimed at curbing tendencies to condone excessive speculation; the inclusion
in (B) of the "should have been known" language is necessary to avoid
unduly harsh results in appropriate cases. The requirements in subsection
(c)(2) are consistent with traditional negligence principles. 44 If the modifier
"significantly" tips the balance unfairly in favor of defendants, it can be
eliminated. It is included in this draft to emphasize that the potential
negative impacts of proposed design alternatives are to be weighed seriously
in these cases.
4.

The Multi-Functional Product Concept

On its face section (e) is aimed primarily at productive machinery
41. Concededly, proof of a feasible alternative is not often imposed explicitly as a formal
requirement at common law. But see Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1976) (feasible alternative is a factor to be considered in determining whether design
is defective). As a practical matter, however, plaintiffs in most design cases find themselves
forced by the circumstances to attack the defendants' designs by pointing to a safer, less

unreasonably dangerous alternative. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322,
335, 154 N.W.2d 488, 498 (1967). Certainly under a negligence approach, the feasible alternative
requirement is implied in the necessity for the plaintiff to show that a reasonable person would
have acted differently from (and more safely than) the defendant. That the feasible alternative
concept is rooted deeply in existing product design liability case law is clear from a review of
the decisions. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 1565-73; Wade, supra note 36, at 83738.
42. See, e.g., Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 I11.App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759
(1968); Jennings v. Tamaker Corp., 42 Mich. App. 319, 201 N.W.2d 654 (1972).

43. See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971) (example of a court
requiring plaintiff to explain the broader implications of a specific proposal for an alternative
design); authorities cited note 41 supra.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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cases. Although it might affect certain types of consumer product cases
inclusion of the phrase "or such person's employer" suggests that it is
mainly directed at cases involving injuries to factory and farm workers using
heavy machinery. The issue here is whether and to what extent producers
and distributors may effectively delegate to purchasers and users part of the
responsibility for deciding whether to purchase and use safety devices.
Section (e) insists that when inclusion by the manufacturer of a particular
safety device would be inimical to one or more functions performed by the
product, the defendant should not be forced by the rules governing liability
for negligent design to include the device. Rather the defendant may defer to
the purchaser's or user's judgment provided he offers the device for purchase or use. 46 In effect, the provision recognizes a legitimate excuse for
such deferral when the person deferred to is in a better position than the
defendant to make a choice of safety equipment suitable to the particular
uses to which the product might be put. It should be observed that the
provision would not bar bystanders, except when the purchaser or user is the
plaintiff's employer. Thus, if a bystander were struck by a rock thrown by a
piece of heavy mowing equipment being used without a safety screen,
subsection (e)(4) would allow the plaintiff to proceed upon allegations of
negligent design notwithstanding the defendant's having established the
conditions described in subsections (e)(1), (2), (3) and (5).
This multi-functional product concept does not represent a radical
departure from existing case law. Although it would change the law in some
states, 47 in others it would merely codify in more formal terms positions
already taken by courts in relevant cases. 48 In the final analysis, the acceptability of a provision of this sort depends upon one's attitude concerning the
appropriate level of paternalism in a system of products liability. Section (e)
does not go so far as to establish the position that purchasers and users
should always be free to determine acceptable levels of design-related risks
for themselves. When a product is suited, as many products are, to a single
basic use, or to several uses that are all compatible with a single safety
device, this provision does not purport to condone a manufacturer's decision
not to incorporate an otherwise sensible safety device simply because the

45. The types of cases envisioned here might involve, for example, equipment adaptable
for use by consumers in different types of home environments requiring different safety

devices.
46. It must be remembered that the defendant is obligated to supply sufficient instructions
and warnings in this context, and may be exposed to liability for any failure to warn. See text

accompanying note 28 supra.
47. See, e.g., Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 44 111. App. 3d 439,358 N.E.2d 317
(1976).
48. See, e.g., Leonard v. Albany Mach. & Supply Co., 339 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 1976).
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risks were obvious to and accepted by the purchaser or user. 49 However,

when a product is multi-functional, and a particular safety device is appropriate for some functions but not for others, this statute allows the choice

regarding that safety device to be made by the person who is in a position to
determine the function to which the product will be put. The proposal

reflects the judgment that to force a collective decision upon all product
purchasers and users in that circumstance would be to push paternalism
beyond its proper bounds.
5.

Compliance with Federal Product Safety Regulations

The provision made by section (f) probably comes the closest to being
unmanageable via federal statute. 50 Two alternatives might be considered:
either compliance with federal standards could constitute a conclusive bar to
recovery upon the basis of negligent design; 51 or the weight to be attached to
such compliance could be left entirely to existing state law.5 2 Of these two

alternatives, the latter seems preferable. Section (f), however, offers a
compromise that, if workable, would be preferable to either alternative.
The utility of federal product safety regulations as standards for deci-

sion is their specificity. The question of whether or not a given product
design at the time of manufacture complied with relevant safety regulations
is patently more adjudicable than is the question of whether or not the design
choices were reasonable under all the circumstances. 53 The chief drawback

of using safety regulations as standards is their possible lack of reliability.
Not all regulations sufficiently protect against risks to merit being employed

as standards in products liability cases.54 To accept without question all
49. Thus, § (e) presumably would not change the result'in cases such as Pike v. Frank 0.
Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 467 P.2d 229, 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 635 (1970), in which the
California court concluded: "[E]ven if the obviousness of the peril is conceded, the modern
approach does not preclude liability solely because a danger is obvious." The product in that
case, a paydozer, would not have fallen into the category of multi-functional products established in § (e).
50. Problems are likely to arise concerning the type of proof required to meet plaintiffs'
statutory burden of "clear and convincing evidence." The provision deliberately avoids using
the word "presumption" to minimize difficulties due to variations among the states with regard
to that concept.
51. The National Products Liability Council draft, see note 26 supra, at this writing, opts
for this alternative.
52. The general rule at common law is that governmental standards are minimum standards, leaving open the question of whether defendants complying with them are nevertheless
negligent. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 203-04 (4th ed. 1971).

Cases in the products liability field have followed this general rule. See, e.g., Hubbard-Hall
Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965). But see Banko v. Continental Motors
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1966).
53. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 1555-58.
54. See H. HEFFRON, FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION (1970) (report prepared

for the National Commission on Product Safety).
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regulations would be to prejudice unfairly the rights of plaintiffs in some
cases. However, to reject the use of such regulations as a standard, as many
courts have done,55 is to miss an important opportunity to render more
consistent and rational the patterns of decisions in many product areas. In
effect, section (f) invites courts to separate the reliable regulations from the
unreliable, and to rely only upon the former. Toward that end, it creates
what amounts to a presumption of reliability in favor of federal product
safety regulations, allowing the presumption to be rebutted in appropriate
cases.
Why is the plaintiff required to overcome the fact of the defendant's
compliance by clear and convincing evidence of the regulation's inadequacy? In part, this requirement reflects a judgment that a majority of (though
admittedly not all) federal product safety standards that pertain directly to
design-related risks of which injured plaintiffs complain are reliable enough
to serve as standards for measuring the reasonableness of the relevant design
choices.16 Thus, the presumption accompanying compliance should be relatively strong. Moreover, were the plaintiff able to circumvent the regulation
by a mere preponderance, it is difficult to see what the statute would
accomplish. In effect, the provision relating to compliance with safety
regulations would impose the same burden upon the plaintiff as does the
57
requirement under state law that the plaintiff prove negligence.
How might a plaintiff prove that a regulation was inadequate? Two
major avenues, which might respectively be characterized as substantive
and procedural, are open to plaintiffs. Substantively, it might be demonstrated that the risks permitted by a particular regulation are substantially
greater than should be acceptable to a reasonable person, and that the
regulations therefore are clearly inappropriate as measures of reasonable
care. Procedurally, it might be shown that the processes by which the
regulatory standards were established, when compared with other governmental standards processes, were inadequate to protect the interests of
product users and consumers. For example, processes in which consumers
55. See note 52 supra.
56. It is not claimed that the federal product safety programs, as programs, are necessarily adequate to protect the public interest. What is referred to here are the specific standards
themselves. It should also be borne in mind that § (f)requires that the federal standards pertain
directly to the hazard of which the plaintiff complains. The language is unavoidably ambiguous,

to some extent, but clearly this requirement should prevent a defendant from arguing that its
product choices were reasonable because they violated no federal safety regulations. Instead, §
(f)contemplates a regulation that specifically addresses, and resolves, the very choices regarding a product design that the plaintiff claims were negligently made by the defendant.
57. Thus, if the plaintiff were required merely to show on a preponderance of the evidence
that the regulation was inadequate, presumably this would be accomplished substantively in
any event by proof on a preponderance that the defendant's design choices, which complied
with the regulation, were unreasonable.
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have no substantial voice and which, either in terms of their establishment or
when viewed in historical perspective, clearly are intended only to establish
minimal safety standards, would be more likely to be susceptible to arguments of inadequacy. 58 On the other hand, a plaintiff would, and should,
have a more difficult time escaping the effects of a defendant manufacturer's
compliance with a specific standard adopted after due consideration by an
agency, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which is recog59
nized generally to weigh and to promote the interests of consumers.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

This proposal is offered by a draftsman attempting to put his money
where his mouth is. Having complained loudly and bitterly over the drift
away from principled decisions in the case law in recent years, it is only
fitting to join the ranks of those attempting to restore principled decisionmaking. At least some of the potential difficulties in implementing a proposal of this sort are obvious. For example, it is certainly possible that these
changes could not be accomplished efficiently by means of a federal statute.
State courts bent upon frustrating its purposes might have a field day with
some of the provisions. The "should have been known by the manufacturer
with reasonable concern for safety" language in subsection (c)(1)(B), for
example, would be particularly vulnerable to being construed and applied in
a way that would always send the issue to the jury. Provisions of this sort
must be included to keep the statute basically fair; yet their inclusion
inevitably threatens the efficacy of the attempt to infuse greater rule formality, and hence integrity, into the system.
These last remarks reveal one of the basic tensions in this area of the
law, indeed, in all of law-the basic tension between the simultaneous and
conflicting needs for both fairness and formality in the rules of decision.
Following the trends in design liability cases in recent years, the courts have
gone too far in trying to be fair. That is, they have gone to the point of tacitly
embracing lawlessness because they have tried to permit all relevant factors
58. The potential difficulties in inviting the parties to add an additional, tangential issue of

this sort to a products liability case already complicated on its facts are apparent. One hopes
that the savings in costs represented by the design cases disposed of by the court under § (f)
would more than make up for the cases where the section merely added to the length and
complexity of the trial. The sorts of standards envisioned as being likely to succumb to
plaintiffs' arguments of inadequacy would be those traditionally established (perhaps until
recently) under the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1191-1204 (West 1974 & Cum.
Supp. 1977). See generally H. HEFFRON, supra note 54, at 107-161; Campbell & Vargo, The
Flammable FabricsAct and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 IND. L. REv. 395 (1976).

59. Again, no claim is made that the Commission has worked wonders in the field of
product safety. However, it is submitted that the design (including performance) standards they

have established would suffice as standards in negligence cases. Section 25(a) of the Consumer
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to be taken into account in deciding every design case on its own special
facts.6" In attempting to tailor-make justice to fit each individual case, they
have ceased to do justice.
Although courts in recent years miy have gone too far in the direction
of trying to do justice in every case on its own unique facts, it would be
equally wrong to attempt to wrench the system around to the opposite
extreme of a system of iron-clad rules, relentlessly applied. The proposal
advanced here is intended to offer a middle ground between the extremes.
Certainly, if a majority of our courts have deliberately opted in recent years
for the "jury's whim" approach, then a proposal of this sort can be
circumvented fairly easily. It is possible, that many judges have simply (and
understandably) been intimidated and overwhelmed by the astounding
growth of products liability in recent years, especially in the field of product
design. The concept of "defect" has proven to be an inadequate basis for
deciding these cases consistently and rationally, and the pressures from the
plaintiffs' bar-and torts commentators- favoring expansion of recovery
have been intense. Most judges would welcome the opportunity that a
statute like this would provide to achieve order and consistency in their
decisions.
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (Supp. V 1975), expressly prohibits giving the stan-

dards that effect.
60. See generally Henderson, supra note 2.

